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ONE PERSON'S THOUGHTS, ANOTHER




The Federal Rules of Evidence, which took effect on July 1, 1975,' rep-
resent the first successful effort to fashion a legal cloth of functional trial
rules from a patchwork of common-law courtroom procedures.2 The pur-
pose of the federal rules was to facilitate the swift and fair resolution of
legal disputes and to ensure the lofty pursuits of judicial economy, truth
and justice.' Some commentators have suggested that an unwritten, albeit
equally important, goal was to establish a national, uniform standard of
courtroom evidentiary procedure.4 Others maintain that it is premature to
1. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). The Federal Rules of
Evidence were the product of 13 years of deliberation by jurists, lawyers, and the United
States Congress. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051.
2. Wellborn, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L.
REv. 49, 50 (1982). Prior endeavors at similar codification failed. The American Law Insti-
tute's MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) was never adopted by any of the states. Id at 49.
The UNIF. R. EvID. (1953) were adopted in full or in part in only six jurisdictions: Califor-
nia, Kansas, New Jersey, Utah, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone. Wellborn,
supra at 49 n.7.
3. FED. R. EVID. 102, which states: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness
in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."
4. [U]niformity was an essential key. Because of the- mobility of Americans
.... State lines have become more and more indistinct in respect of our economy,
politics and sociability. It is quite important to all of us in this nation that our
business people, especially, have some reasonable notion of the law in the various
states and it is certainly important to all of us as trial lawyers to have some reason-
ably solid notion as to what the Rules of Evidence are from district to district,
whether within your own state or from state to state.
[I]t is also important to the federal judiciary that the Rules of Evidence throughout
the federal judicial system be uniform. More and more in recent years have fed-
eral district and courts of appeals judges been assigned from district to district or
circuit to circuit to assist in relieving overburdened judges in other districts and
circuits. It is important to them to have some assurance that the Rules of Evidence
in the various districts and circuits to which they are assigned are as near as may be
the Rules of Evidence with which they have become familiar in their own districts.
Statement of Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence,
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judge whether the rules have achieved their intended purpose. But at
least one, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),6 the state-of-mind exception to
the rule against hearsay, is impeding the goal of a uniform standard for
evidentiary procedure by virtue of its inconsistent application by the fed-
eral circuit courts.'
The federal circuits differ over the application of rule 803(3) because
they disagree over the rule's reach. Specifically, the courts are split con-
cerning the admission of a declarant's statement about his intention to en-
gage in future conduct with another party. Although some courts limit the
use of such statements to proving the intended actions of the declarant,
others will admit such statements even when the declarant's subsequent
actions rely on the cooperation of another party.8
Rule 803(3) is fairly straightforward. It states that the hearsay rule al-
lows into evidence forward-looking statements relating to a declarant's
present frame of mind, including his emotions, intentions and physical
condition.9 Thus, for example, a witness at trial could say that at the time
of the event in dispute, a friend told her, "I feel tired, so I plan to go -to
sleep early tonight." That statement could be used to show that the
speaker was indeed weary, intended to go to bed early and probably did
The Proposed Rules of Evidencefor the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 37 INS.
COUNS. J. 565, 570 (1970); see Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 21, 33-34 (1974), in which the author states:
One final "theme" that is inherent in the very conception of the Rules, is, of
course, the belief that uniformity in the field of Evidence amongst all federal courts
is preferable to conformity to state law of the state where the federal court happens
to be .... [C]ommentators have come out overwhelmingly in favor of uniform-
ity amongst federal courts.
5. See, e.g., S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 5
(3d ed. 1982).
6. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) states in full:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification
or terms of declarant's will.
7. Compare Gual Morales v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d 677, 680 n.2 (lst Cir. 1978)
(barring the use of rule 803(3) to allow into evidence statements by which an inference
regarding third-party conduct could be drawn) with United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76, 82
n.3 (2d Cir. 1978) (approving of the use of rule 803(3) to allow into evidence statements by
which an inference could be drawn regarding the conduct of a party other than the
declarant).
8. Id; see United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967
(1978) (supporting, in theory at least, a prohibition on rule 803(3) statements through which
inferences about third-party conduct could be drawn); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d
353 (9th Cir. 1976) (accepting the opposite view).
9. For the text of the rule, see supra note 6.
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exactly as she intended.'" The rationale for admitting such a statement
into evidence is that it is difficult to offer external proof that will defini-
tively show one's mental state, and therefore it is reasonable, where such
mental state is at issue, to allow into evidence the declarations of the per-
son most qualified to know that state of mind."
The use of state-of-mind evidence to determine subsequent conduct on
the part of the declarant is rooted in the seminal case of Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Hillmon.12 In Hillmon, several insurance companies resisted
the death benefit policy claims made by Sallie Hillmon, whose husband
was purportedly killed at a cowboy campsite in Kansas.'3 The insurance
companies attempted to show that the body found at the campsite was not
that of John Hillmon, the insured. 4 They tried to prove the body was that
of Frederick Walters. Walters had written to his sister and to his fiancee
saying that he planned to head to Colorado with Hillmon.' 5 The body
whose identity was in question was found at the campsite where Hillmon
was said to have been accidentally shot. 6 Neither Hillmon nor Walters
were seen or heard from again. 7 By using the letters to show Walters'
plans, and thus his state of mind at the time, the insurance companies at-
tempted to prove that Walters had actually carried through with those
plans.'8 The Court ruled that the letters could be admitted for that pur-
pose,' 9 ignoring the possibility that using the letters to show Walters went
with Hillmon inspired a long inferential leap-namely that Hillmon was
of a mind to go along with Walters and did, in fact, go along.
The "Hillmon doctrine," as it eventually came to be known, was soon
criticized.2" The Supreme Court in Shepard v. United States warned of the
10. Id.
11. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 295 at 697 (2d ed. 1972). See United States v. Pon-
ticelli, 622 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980), which outlines the require-
ments for admissibility of 803(3) statements. The declarations must be relevant to an issue
in the case. They must be made at about the same time as the event about which the speaker
is commenting. There must be no opportunity or reason for the declarant to lie about his
state of mind. 622 F.2d at 991.
12. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
13. Id. at 285-87.
14. Id. at 287.
15. Id. at 287-88.
16. The shooting took place on either March 17 or March 18, 1879. See id at 286 which
cites March 17 as the date of Hillmon's purported death. But see id at 287 which says Mrs.
Hillmon's evidence at trial showed that Hillmon was killed on March 18. Elsewhere in the
opinion, March 18 is cited as the date of the shooting. See id at 294-95.
17. Id. at 286-87.
18. Id
19. Id at 295-96.
20. See infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
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dangers of using the statements of one person to infer the acts of another.2'
In its comments accompanying rule 803(3), the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence specifically stated that the Hillmon
doctrine remained "undisturbed., 2 2 The Advisory Committee's interpre-
tation of the scope of the Hillmon doctrine appeared significantly narrower
than that of many courts today.23 In the note accompanying the rule, the
21. 290 U.S. 96 (1933). In Shepard, an Army major's sick wife says, "Dr. Shepard has
poisoned me." Id at 98. The statement was offered by the government as a dying declara-
tion. Id at 99. The Shepard Court rejected the statement on that basis. Id at 100. It said
that dying declarations "must have [been] spoken with the consciousness of a swift and
certain doom." Id Mrs. Shepard, however, spoke these words several weeks before her
death at a time when she and her doctors saw signs her health was improving. Id. at 99-100.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had held that Mrs. Shepard's
accusation could be offered as a state-of-mind declaration to rebut defense evidence that she
was suicidal. Shepard v. United States, 62 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1933). Unlike the state-
ment in Hillmon, however, Mrs. Shepard's statement was backward looking and for that
reason alone should not have been allowed into evidence. 290 U.S. at 105-06 (later 803(3)
disallowed such statements except in very limited circumstances. See supra note 6).
The Supreme Court excluded the declaration as state-of-mind evidence because the gov-
ernment never offered it as anything but a dying declaration at trial. The Court, in dicta,
looked with great disfavor on the use of such statements to inculpate a third party. "[The
prosecution] did not use the declarations by Mrs. Shepard to prove her present thoughts and
feelings, or even her thoughts and feelings in times past.. It used the declarations as proof of
an act committed by someone else .. d.." Id at 104. Moreover, the Court expounded on
the dangers of this type of evidence when offered to show the declarant's state of mind.
It will not do to say that the jury might accept the declarations for any light that
they cast upon the existence of a vital urge, and reject them to the extent that they
charged the death to sofife' one else. Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the
compass of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of those accusatory words
would drown all weaker sounds. It is for ordinary minds, and not for psychoana-
lysts, that our rules of evidence are framed. They have their source very often in
considerations of administrative convenience, of practical expediency, and not in
rules of logic. When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of
advantage, the evidence goes out.
Id The Shepard Court then commented on Hillmon, noting the scholarly criticism it had
engendered. Id at 105 & unnumbered footnote. It also indicated it would not stretch fur-
ther the uses of state-of-mind evidence. Id. "The ruling in [Hillmon] marks the high water
line beyond which courts have been unwilling to go." Id. The Court was referring to the
fact that Hillrmon involved forward-looking declarations. Id. 105-06. It reasoned that to
admit Mrs. Shepard's backward-looking statement would contribute to confusion. Its ad-
mission might also signal the demise of the hearsay rule by admitting into evidence virtually
any out-of-court statement. Id at 106.
For scholarly criticism of Hillmon, see Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-Three Years
After, 38 HARV. L. REV. 709, 717 (1925), in which the author states: "It is not customary to
accept one man's extra-judicial assertions as evidence of another's mental state." See Selig-
man, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 146, 155-60 (1912) (contending
that to follow the Hillrmon Court and admit statements of future intent to show that planned
acts were carried out, could eventually open the door for the admission of all hearsay).




Advisory Committee expressly defined the doctrine as one which uses evi-
dence of an intended act as proof that the particular act was carried out.
The Advisory Committee note, however, made no mention of the thorn-
ier issue of whether the doctrine would allow evidence of a declarant's
state of mind to be used to show the subsequent actions of an intended
companion or accomplice.24 Yet that precise expansion of the Hillmon
doctrine occurred when the California Supreme Court upheld a murder
conviction based in part on an accusatory statement made by the victim in
the case of People v. Alcalde.25 In Alcalde, the court allowed the victim's
statement to be used as evidence to support the inference that the defend-
ant planned to be with the victim on the night of her death, that the de-
fendant was with her and that he had an opportunity to kill her.26 This
stretching of the Hillmon doctrine was harshly criticized in a dissent by
Justice Traynor who said the use of a declarant's statements to show the
intended conduct of another was unreliable and prejudicial.27
Nonetheless the significant expansion of the Hillmon doctrine by the Al-
calde court was influential with the authors of the California Evidence
Code.28 The California Evidence Code, in turn, had strong impact on the
authors of the Federal Rules of Evidence.29 Although not specifically
mentioned in its accompanying rule 803(3), the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee was clearly aware of the gloss placed on the Hillmon doctrine
by Alcalde. Thus, the Advisory Committee may have agreed with the Cal-
ifornia code writers, despite the seemingly limiting language of its 803(3)
24. Id. The Advisory Committee's note states, "The rule of Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Hillmon ... allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove doing of the act intended, is,
of course, left undisturbed." Id (emphasis added).
25. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944).
26. Id. at 187-88, 148 P.2d at 632.
27. Id. at 189-90, 148 P.2d at 633.
28. For full discussion of,41calde, see infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text. CAL.
EVID. CODE. § 1250 (California's equivalent of federal rule 803(3)) states in relevant part:
[Elvidence of a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion,
or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain or bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when:
(i) The evidence is offered to prove declarant's state of mind, emotion, or physi-
cal sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the
action, or
(2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.
(b) This section does not make admissible evidence of a statement of mem-
ory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.
CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1250, Comment, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary (citation omit-
ted), which cites the Alcalde holding as one authority for the rule.
29. See FED. R. EvID., Advisory Committee notes,passim, in which the California Evi-
dence Code is mentioned at least 33 times; see also J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 1 WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE, vi (1978) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE].
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note. The inference that it agreed with thelcalde court's interpretation of
Hillmon is fortified by the House Judiciary Committee's subsequent limit-
ing action. The House Judiciary Committee version of 803(3) specificially
limited the evidentiary impact of the Hillmon doctrine to permit as evi-
dence only those statements relating directly to the intended future con-
duct of the declarant. It excludes statements speculating about the future
acts of any other person, either directly or by inference. 30 The Senate did
not comment on the controversy. 3I Thus, instead of silencing critics and
settling the matter, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and the various re-
ports accompanying the rules failed to clarify the scope of the Hillmon
doctrine.32 Indeed, following the adoption of the rules, the federal circuit
30. FED. R. EVID. 803(3), report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, which states:
"[T]he Committee intends that the Rule be construed to limit the... [Hillmon doctrine] so
as to render statements of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct,
not the future conduct of another person."
31. FED. R. EVID. 803(3), report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and report of
the House and Senate conferees.
32. Had both the House and the Senate Judiciary panels explicitly restricted the scope
of the Hillmon doctrine, then unquestionably their interpretation of its reach would be con-
trolling. See Hungate, An Introduction to the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 32 FED. BAR J.
225, 228-29 (1973) (Rep. William Hungate, D-Mo., was chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Criminal Justice when the panel held numerous hearings on the proposed federal
rules.) The Supreme Court Advisory Committee's work on the proposed rules preceded
Congress' examination of them by four years. See 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 29,
vii-viii. Once the rules and the committee comments were presented to Congress, the legis-
lative branch could have remained silent for 90 days, at the end of which the rules would
have automatically gone into effect. Instead, in 1973, Congress adopted Pub. L. No. 93-12,
which allowed it to examine and revise the rules. In so doing, Congress left the Advisory
Committee without veto opportunity or even a right of response. Clearly, the legislative
branch spoke the last, binding words on the subject. Id at viii-x. The question remains
whether the Senate was "speaking" by its silence. The answer, according to one pair of
commentators, David W. Louisell and Christopher B. Mueller, is "yes." D. LOuISELL & C.
MUELLER, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 442, at 561 (1977). They maintain the House Judiciary
Committee's limitation on the Hillmon doctrine is "clear and unequivocal" as opposed to
the explanation outlined in the obtuse Advisory Committee note. Further, they maintain
that had the Senate Judiciary Committee disagreed, it would have objected as it did to other
House Judiciary panel alterations of the proposed rules of evidence. Id at 561-62.
According to several others, Congress had the authority to make binding changes in the
federal rules. One author looked to Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. i (1941), to assert
that Congress has authority to engage in federal rulemaking for the courts. In Sibbach, the
Court said, "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of fed-
eral courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this [the Supreme Court of the
United States] or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the stat-
utes or the constitution ...." Id at 9-10, quoted in, Note, Congressional Preemption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence-Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (Mar. 30, 1973), 49 WASH. L. REV.
1184, 1188-89 (1974). Another author wrote, "In the federal system control (over court pro-
cedure) is cooperatively in the hands of both (Congress and the courts), with Congress hav-




courts have split on the issue of whether state-of-mind evidence stemming
from a declarant's words may be used to prove the actions of another
person.
The current split in the circuits comes to light in cases involving compli-
cated, illicit drug transactions and other conspiratorial activities.3 3 Re-
cently, in United States v. Cicale,3 4 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld the admission of six statements of a declarant,
an alleged drug dealer, regarding his intention to meet at various times
with Cicale, his supplier." The court grappled with the House Judiciary
Committee's narrow interpretation of the Hillmon doctrine before uphold-
ing Cicale's conviction, purportedly based on other, nonhearsay evidence.
The court said the contested statements were admitted to show the involve-
ment of the declarant in the illegal drug activity.3 6 Similarly, in United
States v. Pheaster 37 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
33. See, e.g., United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1771 (1983); United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
34. 691 F.2d 95 (1982).
35. Id at 103 n.2.
36. Id at 104. The court further asserted that Cicale's participation could be proven via
nonhearsay eyewitness testimony. Therefore, the declarant's statements could be used with
the nonhearsay evidence to show that Cicale was part of a drug-sale conspiracy. Id at 103-
05. A dissenting judge, however, said the court had erroneously interpreted Hillmon as
redefined in the federal rules and had allowed inadmissible state-of-mind hearsay to be
offered by the declarant against another person, Cicale. Id at 109. In its holding, the Cicale
court relied heavily on United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1028 (1970), a pre-Federal Rules of Evidence decision that established an eviden-
tiary criteria for the use of hearsay to determine the existence of a conspiracy. In Geaney,
the court said that in order for hearsay evidence regarding the existence'of a conspiracy to be
submitted to a jury, the prosecution must prove the defendant's participation in the conspir-
acy by a "fair preponderance of the evidence independent of the hearsay utterances." Id at
1120. If so, the jury may use the hearsay, together with the other evidence to determine the
defendant's guilt.
The Geaney standard for admitting coconspirator hearsay statements has been adopted by
the majority of the circuits. 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 29, 104-52 to 104-57 &
no.46. It is the applicable standard in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits. Three circuits, the Fifth, Tenth, and District of Columbia, require only that
there be "substantial" evidence of a conspiracy. Id The Ninth Circuit requires that the
court believe a prima facie case exists to show the presence of a conspiracy before allowing
the admission of coconspirator hearsay statements. Id Under the federal rules, conspiracy
is addressed in FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E), which states: "A statement is not hearsay if the
statement is offered against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during
the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Under FED. R. EvID. 104(a), the judge
determines the standard for admitting the hearsay statements of coconspirators. The rule
states, in relevant part: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to
be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court .... "
37. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
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cuit upheld the admission of a classic Hillmon statement from the victim
against two men charged with kidnapping, conspiracy, and extortion. The
court reached this result despite its acknowledgement of the vitality of
some of the criticism of the Hillmon doctrine, and its recognition of the
dispute generated by the limiting language of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee's report.38
Conversely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Jenkins,39 noted that Congress had intended rule 803(3) to
be limited to statements reflecting the conduct of the declarant.' But
while articulating this standard, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless allowed
into evidence a statement of a drug purchaser that ultimately was used
against her companion.4 The court circumvented its own standard by de-
fining the admitted statement as one that explained the reason for the com-
panion's conduct and not one that explained the conduct itself.42 Had the
statement explained the companion's conduct-which consisted of driving
the declarant to her drug supplier-the Fourth Circuit would not have ad-
mitted it.
This Comment will discuss these and other federal circuit court interpre-
tations of the Hillmon doctrine. In examining the state-of-mind exception
to the hearsay rule, it will trace the doctrine through the adoption of the
federal rules and will show the continued disparities in its application
among the circuits. This Comment will demonstrate that attempts to cir-
cumvent a restrictive reading of Hillmon by ignoring the House Judiciary
Committee language accompanying 803(3), or debunking the weight of its
authority, have led to confusion on the part of juries, litigators, and courts.
It will also consider how the Hillmon doctrine, which is rooted in civil
litigation, and its progeny 803(3), may be prejudicial to defendants in
criminal cases. Finally, this Comment will explain why a limitation on the
reach of the doctrine would be fairer to litigants, thereby advancing the
underlying goal of the federal rules.
I. THE HLLMON DOCTRINE: THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD FROM
CROOKED CREEK
A. Hearsay through Hillmon
Hearsay is defined in the federal rules as a statement "other than one
38. Id at 379-80, 380 n.18.
39. 579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1978).
40. Id at 843.
41. Id at 844.
42. Id. at 843.
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made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'43 As the Anglo-Ameri-
can system of justice has developed, the offering of witness testimony in
court, under oath, in the presence of the trier of fact and subject to cross
examination, is considered a more desirable method of eliciting truth than
reliance upon prior statements made outside this carefully controlled envi-
ronment.' Without these in-court controls, the trier of fact is unable to
gauge accurately the out-of-court declarant's perception of an event and
the accuracy of his memory about the incident.45 Moreover, the trier is at
the mercy of the declarant's communication skills and cannot test them in
court, under oath and subject to cross examination.46
Although hearsay evidence is considered inherently less reliable than
evidence offered in court by one with first-hand knowledge, there are some
out-of-court statements that, under certain circumstances, are relevant and
may be very reliable.47 Further, if the court system must choose between
evidence that is not perfectly reliable and no evidence at all, the facilita-
tion of the trial process may sometimes require the use of certain hearsay
statements in an effort to create a reasonable compromise.48 Under the
federal rules, a series of exceptions to the hearsay rule have been devel-
oped that, based on the collective experience of litigators, have come to be
regarded as relatively reliable.49 The principles of reliability and necessity
43. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
44. FED. R. EVID. article VIII, Advisory Committee's note.
45. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 29, 800-11. Others are blunter in their criti-
cism of hearsay: "Hearsay ... is something that depends for its credibility upon the state-
ment of somebody who is not there. It is something that somebody said to somebody else.
In plain English, it is gossip. Hearsay remains Hearsay and gossip remains gossip no matter
how plausibly presented or deviously pursued." Statement of Frank Raichle, Advisory
Committee member, A Discussion of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence before the An-
nual Judicial Conference Second Judicial Circuit of the United States. 48 F.R.D. 39, 53
(1969). The development of the hearsay rule coincided with the changes in the composition
of the jury from one in the 14th-century that included persons who had knowledge of the
litigants and the facts in the case, to one in the 17th-century that had grown increasingly
impartial. Thus, as jurors came to trial with decreasing out-of-court, first-hand knowledge
of the cases, the justice system evolved to ensure that more in-court, first-hand knowledge
would be offered. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 29, 800-09. See 5 WIGMORE Evi-
DENCE § 1364 (3d ed. 1940).
46. 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 29, 800-07 to 800-08.
47. FED. R. EVID. article VIII, Advisory Committee's note.
48. Id See Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evidence.-An Attempt At Uniformity in
Federal Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1061, 1072 (1969), in which the author states:
Hearsay information is simply less reliable than first hand observation, but it
does have some probative value. If utmost reliability is the criterion, then all hear-
say should be excluded. If relevancy is the only test, then all hearsay would be
admitted to the jury who would have to analyze its relative worth.
49. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803, 804; see also Spangenberg, supra note 48, at 1072:
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are, in fact, said to inspire the 803(3) exception to the rule against hear-
say.5 ° The evidence is considered trustworthy because the declarant is be-
lieved to be the best commentator on his own state of mind." Moreover,
because the exception is limited to "then-existing" mental and physical
condition, it is not in danger of distortion through a declarant's faulty
memory. 2 Such testimony is necessary because the declarant's state-of-
mind commentary is most accurate when it is made, and later repetition of
this statement in court is the sole means of bringing this evidence before
the trier of fact.53
The principle that a declarant is the best reader of his own mind was
firmly established in Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Mosley,54 decided long
before the federal rules were enacted. In Mosley, the Supreme Court up-
held the admission into evidence of out-of-court statements made by a
husband to his wife and child about the circumstances surrounding his
serious tumble down some stairs.55 As paraphrased by the Court, Arthur
Mosley, the deceased, told his wife that "he had fallen down the back
stairs and almost killed himself; that he had hit and hurt the back of his
head in falling down". 56 He made a similar statement to his son.57 Mos-
ley was insured against death due to accident under a policy issued by
Travelers' Insurance Company. Although Mosley died as a result of the
injuries he incurred in the fall, the insurance company refused to pay the
proceeds to his widow-beneficiary. There were no witnesses to the acci-
dent, and Travelers maintained that he died of a brain disease.58
At trial, his widow was permitted to testify that shortly before his death
her husband had indeed fallen on the stairs and immediately thereafter
told her he hit his head and felt great pain. Mosley's son was allowed to
The [Advisory] Committee chose a middle ground, reaching into its collective
experience in thousands of trials to determine what types of hearsay have proven to
be quite reliable. Reliable hearsay is considered to have sufficient probative value
to justify admission even though the hearsay declarant is available and could be
called as a witness. Other types of hearsay, considered less reliable, still have
enough value to be admissible if it is necessary either to admit the hearsay or
forego the evidence entirely. This is the situation when the declarant is unable to
attend the trial.
50. D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 32, § 440, at 518.
51. Id at 518-19.
52. Id at 519.
53. Id at 520.
54. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869).
55. Id.
56. Id at 399.
57. Id
58. Id at 398, 400.
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testify to similar statements he heard from his father.59 The jury found for
Mrs. Mosley, and the insurance company appealed.6" The Supreme Court
affirmed,6 dividing the husband's declaration about his fall into his
description of the accident and his feelings after it occurred. The Court
said both statements were logical, reasonable comments on the event at
issue and the attending results.62 It reasoned that the recently injured
Mosley was the best source of knowledge about his pain.63 "Wherever the
bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the
usual expressions of such feelings are original and competent evidence. '
Mosley's state-of-mind declarations were used in their traditional man-
ner, to describe the declarant's current feelings. Mosley's future actions,
based on his present verbalized intent, were not at issue. Over twenty
years later, the Supreme Court, in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon,65
allowed the use of the declarant's statements to depict his present inten-
tions, and by inference to show that those intentions were eventually car-
ried OUt.66 In Hillmon, the intentions were expressed in a pair of letters
written by traveller Frederick Walters to his loved ones.67 One letter Wal-
ters wrote from Wichita to his financee, Alvina Kasten in Fort Madison,
stated, "I will stay here until the fore part of next week, and then will leave
here to see a part of the country that I never expected to see when I left
home, as I am going with a man by the name of Hillmon . "..."68 In
another letter mailed in early March of 1897, he told his sister that he
planned "to leave Wichita on or about March the 5th, with a certain Mr.
Hillmon, a sheeptrader, for Colorado or parts unknown to me."6 9 Neither
Walters nor Hillmon were seen again after the night Hilmon was said to
have been accidentally shot at the campfire.7"
59. Id at 403-04.
60. Id at 403.
61. Id at 409.
62. Id. at 404, 408.
63. Id at 408.
64. Id at 404.
65. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 294.
68. Id at 288.
69. Id
70. Id. at 285-89. Hillmon was heavily insured-$10,000 from Mutual, $10,000 from
New York Life, and $5,000 from Connecticut Mutual. Id. at 285-86. This is significant
given that he was described as "absolutely poor, without a definite occupation." J. WIG-
MORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 860 (1913). Furthermore, Hillmon's best friend,
Levi Baldwin, ruminated about an insurance fraud scheme to a local doctor in Tonganoxie,
Kansas, the year before Hillmon's disappearance. Id. at 860-62. "Doc, would it not be a
good scheme to get your life insured for all you can, and get someone to represent you as
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The Hillmon Court called the Walters' letters competent evidence of
Walters' intentions when he wrote them.7' Since Walters' intent was a
material fact in the case, the Court concluded the letters were admissible to
show Walters planned to travel and that he planned to travel with
Hillmon.72 It said the letters also showed it was probable that Walters
carried out his travel plans and that he travelled with Hillmon." The
Court, however, ignored the fact that it might not have been Hillmon's
intention to accompany Walters. In its decision, the Court relied in part
on Mosley, which established a doctrine, founded in reliability and neces-
sity, that essentially said a person is the best judge of what is on his mind."
The Hillmon Court stretched that doctrine, however, by asserting that be-
cause one knows his own state of mind one can also accurately perceive
and comment on his future actions. Furthermore, in what was arguably
dicta, the Court established the foundation for a major inferential leap. It
implied that a declaration by one party of his planned conduct, when it
involves the participation of another, is competent to show that it is prob-
able that both the declarant and the other party completed that conduct.75
Hillmon, a civil case, was also based in part on the decision of what was
then the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals76 in the criminal case of
Hunter v. State .7' Benjamin Hunter was convicted of the murder of John
M. Armstrong.78 On appeal, he argued that the court should not have
admitted a statement Armstrong made to his son on the day of the murder
implicating Hunter. The son testified that Armstrong had said "he in-
tended to go with Mr. Hunter, and he and Mr. Hunter were going to Cam-
den that night.",79 Hunter also objected to the admission of a letter written
by Armstrong to his wife the afternoon before his death, which said, "I will
not be home much before nine o'clock. Am going over to Camden again
with Mr. Hunter, on business ...."I'
In upholding the admission of this evidence, the court found the com-
ments made by Armstrong to his family were natural, common and relia-
dead and then skip out for Africa... ?" Id at 862. Baldwin, himself a bankrupt posing as
a farmer in "good circumstances," helped procure Hillmon's sizable policies. Id at 861.
71. 145 U.S. at 299.
72. Id at 299-300, 295-96.
73. Id at 295-96.
74. Id at 296 (citing 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 404-05).
75. 145 U.S. at 296.
76. The current Supreme Court of New Jersey was previously known as the Court of
Errors and Appeals.
77. 145 U.S. at 299 (citing 40 N.J.L. 495 (1878)).
78. 40 N.J.L. at 496.
79. Id. at 534.
80. Id at 536.
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ble. Armstrong appeared to have no motive to lie.8 The court also found
that if it was reasonable for a man to tell his family where he was going,
then it was just as reasonable to inform them of the person with whom he
planned to travel.8 2 Thus, Hunter supported the Hillmon Court's view that
intended acts of persons other than the declarant could be inferred from a
person's state-of-mind declarations about himself.83
B. The Permanent Stretching of Hillmon
Despite its progeny, Hillmon was a civil case concerned only with evi-
dence relating to the intended behavior of the declarant. It was not until
the modern-day decision of People v. 41calde,84 a California criminal case,
that the expanded reach of Hillmon became solidified in the common law.
Florencio "Frank" Alcalde was convicted of the murder of Bernice Cur-
tis largely on circumstantial evidence, including the state-of-mind declara-
tions made by the victim, and was sentenced to death. 5 Alcalde had been
a San Francisco welder who, upon leaving his wife and child, began an
intense love affair with a woman he referred to only as a "hot blond," but
who was shown by circumstantial evidence to be Curtis. 6 On the day of
her murder, Curtis made statements that would later prove to be the most
damaging evidence against Alcalde. She told her brother-in-law and her
roommate that she intended to have dinner that evening with "Frank."87
Her bruised, beaten body was discovered the next morning in a field in
nearby Santa Clara County.88
On appeal, Alcalde argued against the admission of several items of evi-
dence, including Curtis' comments about her intent to date "Frank," main-
taining that they were hearsay. 89 The California Supreme Court, in
upholding Alcalde's conviction, recognized the deceased's statements as
hearsay, but relied in part on Hillmon to allow their use against the de-
fendant. The court said that one can infer an act was completed following
one's expressed intent to do the act.' If made under circumstances that
81. Id at 538.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944).
85. Id at 179, 148 P.2d at 628.
86. Id at 180, 148 P.2d at 628. Curtis was blond, and Alcalde had shown photographs
of a blond woman to co-workers. Other evidence showed he had called Curtis at her
roominghouse telephone. Id
87. Id. at 181, 148 P.2d at 628.
88. Id. at 179, 148 P.2d at 628.
89. Id. at 185, 148 P.2d at 631.
90. Id at 185-86, 148 P.2d at 631.
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would render the statements of intent trustworthy, and relevant to an issue
central to the case, the declarations could be admitted.9' The court ob-
served: (1) it was natural to comment to friends about an intended date;
(2) there would be no reason for Curtis to ie about the date; (3) the nick-
name "Frank," by which Curtis referred to her date for the evening in
question, was a name Alcalde himself had used; and (4) Alcalde had ad-
mittedly been dating Curtis.92 Thus, the Alcalde court concluded that
Curtis' statement, coupled with additional corroborating evidence, could
be given to a jury to draw an inference of guilt.
93
Justice Traynor, apparently concerned at this stretching of the Hi//mon
doctrine issued a strong dissent.94 He pointed to Justice Cardozo's opinion
in Shepard to outline how dangerously prejudicial the victim's statements
could be for the defendant. 95 Traynor maintained that the statement could
only be used to show Curtis' intent and should not have been used to foster
the inference that Alcalde had the opportunity to murder Curtis and in-
deed took advantage of it. He emphasized that a declaration of one per-
son's thoughts cannot be a reliable indication of the actions that another
party may have taken.96 He further asserted that the only purpose served
by the admission of Curtis' comment was to allow the jury to infer that
Alcalde dated the victim on the night of her death, brought her to the
location of the crime, and killed her.97
The Alcalde dissent remains a strong and oft-cited argument against the
use of state-of-mind declarations to determine the denouement of the in-
tended conduct of a person other than the declarant, particularly in the
criminal context.98 Additionally, because of the lack of clarity in the fed-
eral rules, the same arguments that fueled Justice Traynor's dissent in Al-
calde can be heard in the continued debate about the present-day reach of
the Hillmon doctrine.99
II. THE RULE 803(3) ROADMAP
There is no doubt that Congress in 1975 could have avoided the subse-
91. Id at 187-88, 148 P.2d at 632.
92. Id
93. Id at 188, 148 P.2d at 632.
94. Id at 189-90, 148 P.2d at 633.
95. Id at 633 (citing Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933)). For details of
Shepard, see supra note 21.
96. Id at 189, 148 P.2d at 633.
97. Id at 190, 148 P.2d at 633.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 384-85 (9th Cir. 1976) (Ely, J.,




quent confusion regarding the scope of the Hillmon doctrine."co An exam-
ination of the long and seemingly interminable federal rules drafting
process offers little insight into the "state of mind" of the drafters and the
legislators on this particular issue.'
100. See supra note 32.
101. The labyrinth through which the federal rules passed took many turns. In 1961,
Chief Justice Warren appointed a Special Committee on Evidence "to study the ... feasi-
bility" of developing uniform Federal Rules of Evidence. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 7051. Within a year, the commit-
tee deemed the proposed rulemaking effort a worthy endeavor. By March 1963, it was rec-
ommended by the Judicial Conference that an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence
be appointed to begin the task. Id. at 5. In March 1965, the Advisory Committee of judges,
lawyers and law professors was formed and the difficult work began. By early 1969, a draft
of the committee's proposed rules, along with extensive panel comments, were circulated for
comment. Id Following the issuance of the comments, a revised draft was submitted to the
Supreme Court in 1970. It was returned to the Judicial Conference for further revision. The
following year, the recirculated draft was returned to the Court and in 1972, the Court
promulgated the rules which were scheduled to take effect in July 1973. Id But, pursuant
to Pub. L. No. 93-12, specifically enacted by Congress to give it an opportunity to examine
the rules in detail, Congress postponed putting them into effect until the legislators expressly
approved them. Id
The House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice held six days of
hearings on the rules and developed a 600-page record of testimony. The subcommittee
held mark-up sessions and then developed and circulated its own version of the rules.
Within six weeks, some 90 comments came back to the subcommittee. H.R. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7077-78. One
commentator, Joseph S. McCarthy, Chairman of the District of Columbia's Bar Study Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, expressed concern about proposed Rule 803(3).
The rule, he said:
may merely refer to the well-accepted use of prior intention (as evidenced by a
declaration or otherwise) as circumstantial evidence tending to show that the de-
clarant probably carried out his intention. The decision [Hillmon] however, also
approved the use of the intention of A of going on a trip with B as evidence of what
B later did. This gets before the trier the intention of someone other than the
declarant. But the declarant, though he knows his own state of mind, can only
know the intention of B through B's statements to A or through A's inference from
circumstances or both. This hearsay exception is said to be reliable only as to A's
statements of his own then existing intentions since A is conscious of his own inner
state of mind and there are no memory problems. The rationale does not extend to
A's statements of B's inner purposes, however, but only to B's declarations of his
own existing intention. . . . The Committee therefore recommends either that the
Notes be changed to expressly reflect the applicability of Rule 803(3) only to decla-
rations of the intention of A to prove A's probable future conduct or at least that
the sentence approving Hillmon be deleted. The latter action would at least avoid
foreclosing the raising of the above problem in future cases.
Rules of Evidence (Supplement) Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice (Formerly
Designated as Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws) of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary on the Proposed Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 282-83, 288
(1973). The subcommittee, after five additional mark-up sessions, devised a new version of
the rules. H.R. REP. No. 650, at 4. The latest version limited the declarant's state-of-mind
comments to his own future comments. FED. R. EvID. 803(3). It was favorably reported by
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Commentators David Louisell and Christopher Mueller contend that
the Senate, by silence, assented to the House Judiciary Committee inter-
pretation of Hillmon. They assert that elsewhere in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, where the House made changes in the Advisory Committee
draft, the Senate voiced its disapproval where warranted. 0 2 Conversely,
Stephen Saltzburg and Kenneth Redden do not contend that the House
Judiciary Committee had the silent approval of the Senate when it limited
the reach of the Hillmon doctrine. 0 3 Instead, these authors have adopted
a wait-and-see attitude. They argue that the majority of the courts have
allowed state-of-mind evidence showing intent to be admitted against the
declarant and other parties where applicable. They further maintain that
more case law must develop before it can be determined whether courts
are attributing the House judiciary panel's Hillmon limitation to the full
Congress and thus following it." The Saltzburg and Redden view is
the full committee. H.R. REP. No. 650 at 4. It was approved by the House on Feb. 6, 1974.
S. REP. No. 1277, at 6. Following two days of hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee
panel also reported the rules favorably. Id. at 1, 7. The Senate made 44 amendments to the
House version of the bill, but it did not comment on, or alter the House's 803(3) position.
CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, I1, reprinted in, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7098. After two days in conference at the very end of the legislative session, the
conferees ironed out the differences in their versions of the rules, again without mentioning
the 803(3) discrepancy. Id. The conference report was adopted by Congress within a week
after it was completed. 120 Cong. Rec. H12253 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Rep.
Hungate).
102. D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 32, § 442, at 561-62, in which the authors
state:
An inference from silence is often dangerous, and rarely conclusive, but in this
case silence seems significant. Even on matters of construction alone, where no
change in the text of the Rule was contemplated, comments in the House Report
evoked response in the Senate Report, as happened in connection with the very
next provision-Rule 803(4). It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that if the Sen-
ate Committee had disagreed with the construction preferred by the House Com-
mittee, something would have been said.
FED. R. EvID. 803(4) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensa-
tions, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 32, § 442, 561-62 n.23, in which the authors
explain that the 803(4) disagreement between the House and the Senate arose because the
House wanted to make it clear that the exception should not adversely affect present doctor-
patient privilege rules. The Senate, however, wanted to make it clear that the House Judici-
ary Committee comment would not adversely impact on the privilege waiver provisions of
FED. R. Civ. P. 35. The authors cite H.R. REP. No. 650, supra note 101, and S. REP. No.
1277, supra note 101, for details.




shared by University of Virginia law professor Graham Lilly."°5 He, too,
writes that more case law is needed before the impact of the House Judici-
ary Committee's limit can be assessed. Lilly notes that courts may circum-
vent the dilemma by admitting state-of-mind declarations against third
parties but then giving limiting instructions at trial.'
°6
Judges admit they are confused by the proper reach of the Hillmon doc-
trine following the enactment of the federal rules, and in light of the House
Judiciary Committee's limit and the Senate's failure to address it. In a
written equivalent of throwing up his hands, Judge Friendly in United
States v. Mangan '07 wondered which of the conflicting Hillmon interpreta-
tions should guide him. I"' Essentially, under the federal rules, the courts
have two choices when they are faced with cases involving state-of-mind
evidence that touches on the intended conduct of the declarant and the
possible conduct of another party. One option is to accept the House Judi-
ciary Committee's limit on the scope of Hillmon as controlling. Thus, evi-
dence of a statement by the declarant regarding his own intended conduct
would be admissible at trial to show that the conduct was undertaken. Ev-
idence offered to show the intended conduct of a person other than the
declarant would be excluded. The second option is to accept the House
Judiciary Committee's limitation as merely a suggestion that failed to be
adopted by the Senate or the entire Congress. A court adopting that view
would permit a declarant to comment about his intended conduct even if
that conduct relied on the participation of another. Thus, the trier of fact
would be able to draw the inference that the other party intended to par-
ticipate in the future act with the declarant and probably did partici-
pate."0 Before the enactment of the federal rules gave courts these distinct
105. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 65, at 226-27 (West
1978).
106. Id. at 227.
107. 575 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1978).
108. Id. at 43 n.12. Judge Friendly said:
Are the Senate and the President or, for that matter, the members of the House
who were not on the Committee to be considered to have adopted the text of the
Rule, as glossed by the Advisory Committee's Note that Rule 803(3) enacted
Hillmon, or the House Committee's "construction" which, in effect, seriously re-
stricts Hillmon?
109. The First Circuit has opted for the first approach and has spoken against the exten-
sion of Hillmon to reach the intentions of a person other than the declarant. Gual Morales
v. Hernandez Vega, 579 F.2d 677 (1978). The Second Circuit has taken the opposite ap-
proach, but because of the conflict surrounding the doctrine it prefers not to rule on 803(3)
grounds. United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95 (1982); United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32
(1978). The Third and Fourth Circuits in theory support a limited reach to Hillmon state-
ments that is in line with the House Judiciary Committee view. United States v. Jenkins,
579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1978); Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert.
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options, discussions concerning the scope of the Hillmon doctrine re-
mained largely academic." ° But when the federal rules directly chal-
lenged the common law approach to Hillmon through the House Judiciary
Committee's interpretation, the debate moved from the pages of the law
reviews to the text and notes of court decisions."'
III. MODERN-DAY APPLICATION OF THE HILLMON DOCTRINE BY
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
A. The Expansive Approach. Extending Alcalde's Stretch
Three federal circuits-the Second, Eighth, and Ninth-follow the lead
of the Alcalde court and take an expansive approach to the admission of
Hillmon statements. Two of these circuits-the Second and Ninth-have
expressed concern or confusion over the post-rules perimeter of the
Hillmon doctrine.
The Second Circuit in United States v. Cicale" 2 was faced with the epit-
ome of the modern-day illicit drug conspiracy, with its large cast of infor-
mants, suppliers, purchasers, and users, offering a fertile ground upon
which the seeds of the Hillmon controversy could take root. In Cicale,
three alleged drug dealers, working through a sidewalk sales agent, spent
six months in negotiations with an undercover narcotics officer. The talks
eventually culminated in the arrest of the dealers and subsequent convic-
tions on conspiracy and a variety of drug possession and distribution
charges." 3 On appeal to the Second Circuit, one issue was whether six
statements made by the street intermediary to the undercover agent impli-
cating Cicale were admissible against Cicale in court.
denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976). The Eighth Circuit continues to apply a common-law, broad-
reaching approach to Hillmon that is similar to Aicalde. United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d
895 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976). The Ninth Circuit appears to follow that same
view, but wrestles intellectually with both the many questions surrounding the doctrine
raised by scholars and the House Judiciary limitation. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d
353 (1976).
110. See supra note 21 for examples of scholarly criticism of Hillmon. Prior to the enact-
ment of the Federal Rules, Hillmon, which was comprised of several related cases, was cited
primarily for its principle of the effects of consolidation. See Signal Mountain Portland
Cement Co. v. Brown, 141 F.2d 471, 477, (6th Cir. 1944) (same plaintiff sues in each of
several cases but the common defendant, is allowed the same number of jury challenges as
the plaintiff, which is deemed to follow Hillmon; see also Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668,
672-73 (10th Cir. 1944) (consolidation of actions for trial which seem alike is discretionary
with the court).
11. See, e.g., supra note 108.
112. 691 F.2d at 95.
113. Id at 97-102.
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In testimony, the undercover officer related the statements in question.
In each, the intermediary had told the officer of his intention to meet his
drug supplier in a variety of locations."14 In each instance, undercover
drug enforcement officials observed the declarant shortly after he made the
statements either in the presence of Cicale or entering Cicale's home."' It
was clear these statements were offered to show that the declarant intended
to meet Cicale for illicit purposes, that the declarant carried out the meet-
ings as planned, and that it could thus be inferred that Cicale participated.
The Second Circuit side-stepped the Hillmon issue, stating that nonhearsay
evidence independent of the declarant's comments proved the illicit nature
of the planned transaction and the extent of Cicale's role in it.
116
Indeed, there was independent evidence showing that the declarant had
conversations and meetings with Cicale," 7 that Cicale tended to drive eva-
sively after some of these sessions," 8 and that Cicale spoke to the declar-
ant in cryptic sentences that appeared to indicate a desire to keep their
meaning secret." 9 If viewed in a vacuum, however, that evidence would
be less than conclusive evidence of criminal activity. It could be argued
that such evidence would show only that the declarant and Cicale knew
each other, that Cicale was a poor driver, and that he was concerned about
keeping some matter secret. It is only when the explanatory hearsay state-
ments of the declarant are admitted into evidence that the illicit purpose
behind the activity can be strongly inferred.
The court admitted that without all the eyewitness evidence, it would
have been required to address the controversy over the current scope of the
Hillmon doctrine, something it clearly attempted to avoid.' 20 Yet the
court still added its voice to the debate by pointing out that it had refused
114. Id at 103 n.2. The first of the six statements, made on January 15, 1981 was para-
phrased by the officer who told the court that "he [the intermediary] said he was going to
talk to him [the supplier] right now ... ." Id On March 19 the intermediary had told the
officer, "I'll go talk to one of my sources .. " Id The officer also said the intermediary
"said he was going to go there as soon as he left me." Id The statement made on March 23
to the officer by the intermediary was, "I'm going to drop by the guy's house that is provid-
ing this heroin, the source of supply, right now ... " Id On March 25 the same interme-
diary said, "Look, as soon as I finish eating, I'm going to go over to the guy's house..."
Id On April 7 he said, "I will go talk to him right now because he lives a couple of blocks
from here ..." Id And finally, the next day he said, "I'll talk to the guy. He's waiting for
me so let me go, and I am going to pick him up right now at the restaurant where he's at."
Id
115. Id at 103.
116. Id at 103-04.
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in the past to limit Hillmon to a declarant's comments about his own in-
tent. The court explained its Hillmon Doctrine philosophy by stating that
the doctrine permits inferences to be drawn from a declarant's statements
to demonstrate a relationship with another who is implicated in a criminal
plot. 2 ' This relationship then makes more feasible the inference that the
other person is also involved in the criminal plan. Thus, the statements
can be used to bolster the existence of a conspiracy to perform the illicit
act. 122
121. Id
122. Id (citing United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, at 1297-98 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977);
United States v. D'Amato, 493 F.2d 359, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974);
United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 377-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919
(1961)). In Stanchich, as in Cicale, the court admitted statements of an accused counter-
feiter, Alan Fitzgerald, against an associate, Eric Stanchich, using the 801(d)(2)(E) cocon-
spiracy rule to convict him of the same offense. Sanchich, 550 F.2d at 1295-98. At issue
was the repeated use by Fitzgerald of the phrase "his people" to a businessman working
undercover for government drug enforcement officials. Id at 1295-97. For example, the
undercover agent attempted to borrow a sample counterfeit bill shown to him by Fitzgerald,
ostensibly to show "his banker," but in reality to have it photographed as evidence of the
crime. Before granting permission to the agent to hold the bill, Fitzgerald said he needed to
check with "his people." Id at 1296. In a situation much like the one in Cicale, following
the statements, Fitzgerald was seen in the presence of Stanchich and others. 1d The trial
court dismissed a conspiracy count against Stanchich. Therefore, Stanchich argued it was
reversible error to admit those statements as coconspirator exceptions to the rule against
hearsay. Id at 1295. On appeal, however, the court relied on Geaney and admitted the
statements. Id at 1297. "In view of our holding that Fitzgerald's statements were properly
admitted under the conspiracy exception, we can leave the argument as to the state of mind
exception to another day." Id at 1298 n. 1. Nonetheless, the court briefly expounded on the
relevance of the state-of-mind exception to this case, and in so doing, seemed to have hope-
lessly confused the state-of-mind exception with the conspiracy rule. Id at 1297-98 n.l. In
essence, the court appeared to contend that when independent, corroborating evidence is
offered to bolster the hearsay under circumstances such as those present in Sianchich, the
evidence will be admissible against an associate or accomplice. Thus, the question of
whether the statements at issue fit the coconspiracy rule or the state-of-mind rule is purely
academic. In the Stanchich Court's view, the result is the same. Id at 1298 n. I.
In D'Amalo, decided before the enactment of the federal rules, a drug intermediary ar-
ranging a buy between his alleged supplier and an undercover agent told the agent he had to
meet "his people" to determine if heroin could be exchanged without up-front capital. 493
F.2d at 361. The middle-man walked over to a black Oldsmobile at a nearby curb and
engaged in a brief conversation with the car's driver and passenger, who was later identified
as D'Amato. He immediately returned to the undercover agent to say "his people" okayed
the deal without the up-front money. Id Similar statements were made in connection with
future buys, all of which were used in evidence at trial against D'Amato. Id at 362-63. The
Second Circuit also admitted these statements under what was then the case law standard
for the coconspiracy rule.
Annunziato was another pre-rules case in which the Second Circuit upheld the conviction
of a union official for accepting a bribe from a construction company president. 293 F.2d at
373. The district court was held to have correctly admitted testimony from the son of the
company president, the elder man having died prior to trial. Id at 376-77. The son testified
that his father had told him Annunziato had requested money in connection with a con-
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In his dissent, Judge Ward maintained that the majority had improperly
used the declarant's state-of-mind comments against Cicale in affirming
the trial court's decision that Cicale was part of an illicit drug-selling con-
spiracy.' 23 Judge Ward agreed that hearsay statements could sometimes
be used to prove the existence of a conspiracy when there is other nonhear-
say evidence available. But he argued that when state-of-mind hearsay
evidence is used for that purpose it must be limited solely to the declarant's
own future conduct.
124
struction job. The father told the son he intended to send Annunziato the payoff. Id' The
court said the statement of the father was admissible as a comment by a coconspirator. Id.
at 377. It was also admissible as a Hillmon statement of intent. Id. The court recognized
the problem previously described in Shepard. See supra note 21. It appreciated the danger
of faulty memory that is inherent in backward-looking hearsay declarations. In Annunziato,
the statements face both directions. The company president was commenting on future in-
tent when he told his son he planned to send the payoff, but he was also making a statement
regarding a past event when he said Annunziato had sought the payment. The Annunziato
court, however, said 11ilmon provided authority to admit the backward and forward-look-
ing testimony. 293 F.2d at 377-78. Citing Prof. Morgan's BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE,
293 (1954), it said Walters' letters outlining the author's intent to travel with Hillmon left a
strong inference that a prior travel plan existed between Walters and Hillmon. 293 F.2d at
377. The implications that this type of evidence might have on persons other than the de-
clarant, however, did not concern the Annunziato court. It cited Alcalde with approval as
support for its position. Id
123. 691 F.2d at 109 (Ward, J., dissenting).
124. Id In fact, in a footnote, Judge Ward's dissent pointed out that the government
obviously understood this when it had formulated its case against Cicale. "The Govern-
ment's decision not to rely on Rule 803(3) at any juncture of these proceedings stands, in my
view, as eloquent proof of that rule's inapplicability to the facts of Cicale's case." Id at n. 1.
The dissent also mentioned a pre-rules case, United States v. Kaplan, 510 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1974), which had a factual situation similar to Cicale. In Kaplan, the Second Circuit re-
versed a narcotics conviction that had been based on inadmissible evidence. An undercover
drug enforcement agent made contact with a drug seller. Id at 607-08. The day before the
agent was to consummate a sizable drug purchase agreement, the seller told the agent in a
telephone conversation that his drug-supplying "connection" would be at the sale. Id at
608. The following day, when the agent went to the seller's house to make the purchase,
Kaplan was present, apparently in a drugged state. Kaplan was never introduced to the
agent as the so-called "connection," but through casual conversation with the agent, Kaplan
demonstrated some knowledge that a narcotics deal was in progress. Id. Shortly after the
agent made the drug purchase, Kaplan and the seller were arrested. The trial court, citing
Hillmon, admitted the telephone conversation as evidence of the agent's state of mind upon
entering the narcotics sales meeting. Id at 609-10 n.2. As an aside, the court indicated the
statement might also be admissible as a coconspirator statement. Id at 609 n.2, 611.
The Second Circuit reversed Kaplan's conviction because of the likelihood that the jury
had unfairly used the evidence to show not the agent's state of mind but the intentions and
subsequent actions of Kaplan. Id at 610. In other words, the evidence might have shown
the jury that Kaplan was actually the "connection." Id Because the trial judge merely
ruminated on how the statement might be a proper coconspirator statement without making
the necessary Geaney finding, the appeals court declined to accept the statement on that
basis. Id. at 611-12. Ironically, in Kaplan the Second Circuit appeared. to have taken a
narrower view of 1illmon before the enactment of the federal rules than it did in the post-
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In Cicale, the Second Circuit demonstrated its willingness to expansively
apply the Hillmon doctrine and its reluctance to get involved in a post-
federal rules debate about the extent of the doctrine's reach. Instead, the
court limited its discussions about the rule 803(3) dispute to footnotes or
dicta, indicating its tacit approval of the use of Hillmon statements as evi-
dence of the future conduct of persons other than the declarant.' 25 Fi-
nally, the Cicale court blurred the lines between the 801 (d)(2)(E)
coconspirator exception to the rule against hearsay with the 803(3) state-
of-mind exception. This had the effect of diluting the strength of the hear-
say exceptions which are purposely designed to be separate and distinct. '26
rules Cicale case. Specifically, the court was reluctant to let the state-of-mind or cocon-
spirator exceptions be used to explain the nonhearsay evidence of Kaplan's behavior as
viewed by an eyewitness. This is precisely what the court later allowed in Cicale.
125. 691 F.2d at 104 n.4.
126. Id. at 103-05. See supra note 49. The Second Circuit most recently examined the
Hillmon doctrine in United States v. Sperling, No. 83-1164, slip op. at 1193 (Jan. 20, 1984),
in which it reaffirmed its Cicale rationale. The Sperling court held that .the state-of-mind
evidence of one party to an illicit narcotics deal could be used to help convict the other party
provided it was augmented by sufficient corroboration. Slip op. at 1202-05.
An undercover narcotics agent negotiated with Beverly Ash for the ostensible purpose of
arranging a drug purchase. Id. at 1196. Ash told the agent one morning she intended to
meet her drug "source" that day at noon. Ash did in fact meet with the defendant, Nicholas
Sperling, at a delicatessen at about 12:15 p.m.. She later told the agent that her source had
agreed to sell him some heroin. Id. In addition, convicted drug offender Leroy "Nicky"
Barnes, hoping to win a presidential pardon from a life sentence without possibility of pa-
role, testified at Sperling's trial that Barnes and Sperling's father, also serving time in prison,
had arranged an Ash-Sperling drug transaction from their cells. Id at 1195. Barnes said he
and the elder Sperling had arranged for Ash to meet the defendant at a mid-town Manhat-
tan delicatessen and that each would carry copies of Life magazine in order to recognize one
another. An undercover agent observed Ash and the defendant entering the delicatessen
with the magazines, sitting together, and exchanging a piece of paper. Id at 1195-96.
Shortly after this meeting, the agent approached Ash to arrange a drug purchase. Id. at
1196.
At trial, the government successfully introduced the statement made to the agent by Ash,
who was murdered after her arrest. Id. at 1196-98. On appeal Sperling argued against the
admission of Ash's state-of-mind declarations to the agent and Barnes' testimony. Sperling
maintained that Ash's comments and the jailhouse conversations between his father and
Barnes could not be used against him under the Hillmon doctrine. Id at 1202. Citing Ci-
cale, the Court disagreed. It said "a declarant's Hillmon declarations regarding his own
state of mind are admissible against a nondeclarant when they are linked with independent
evidence that corroborates the declarations." Id at 1203. The court ruled that agent who
watched the Ash-Sperling meeting that followed Ash's declarations provided the "link"
needed to corroborate Ash's statements and render them admissible at trial. The prison
conversations describing the Ash-Sperling meeting were also corroborated through the un-
dercover eyewitnesses. Id at 1203-04. As in Cicale, the court failed to consider how this
picture of alleged criminal activity was almost meaningless absent Ash's state-of-mind dec-
larations about her future intention to meet her drug source, and the jailhouse conversations
between Baines and the elder Sperling to explain it.
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The Second Circuit followed an approach in United States v. Mangan 127
that was much like its reasoning in Cicale. The Mangan brothers, Frank
and Kevin, devised an elaborate scheme for defrauding the Internal Reve-
nue Service. It involved plucking the names and social security numbers
of seven existing taxpayers from the IRS files, devising three fictitious busi-
nesses to employ the seven, and filing false returns listing heavy partner-
ship losses. Then the brothers procured rooms in cheap hotels and
rooming houses as mailing addresses for the seven hefty refunds they
hoped to obtain through the filing of the fraudulent returns. 128 In what
was essentially double hearsay, an accomplice of the brothers was permit-
ted to testify to statements made to him by Kevin describing the intended
tax fraud. These statements implicated not only Kevin but Frank as well.
Kevin explained to the accomplice the method by which the scam would
operate. He said his brother Frank would be responsible for choosing tax-
payers' names and filing income tax returns in order "to beat these legiti-
mate taxpayers to their own money."'
129
The court upheld the brothers' convictions and the admission by the
lower court of Kevin's statements against Frank under the coconspirator
exception to the hearsay rule. In so doing, the court admitted it was mak-
ing a very close call.13 ° In a footnote, however, the Second Circuit indi-
cated its strong approval of the government's argument that Kevin's
statements could have been admitted as 803(3) hearsay exceptions. 13'
Still, the court openly declared that because the federal rules had scram-
bled the Hillmon Doctrine it would rather not rule on that ground. 32 It
noted, however, that the 803(3) argument was relevant in Mangan because
of its factual similarity to Hillmon. '3 In Mangan, Kevin's statements
showed not only his own plans but those of Frank with whom Kevin be-
lieved he would be working.134 In Hillmon, Walters' letters arguably
127. 575 F.2d 32 (1978).
128. Id at 36. They were able to initiate the scheme because Frank Mangan was an
Internal Revenue Service agent. Id
129. Id at 42.
130. Id at 43. The court indicated it had qualms about the government's theory that the
statements met the 801(d)(2)(E) requirement as being in furtherance of the conspiracy. In
the court's view, the statements may not have been made to induce the listener to come on
board the conspiracy because the listener was already part of the conspiracy. In the end, the
court opted for an evidentiary technicality. The defense apparently failed to object to the
introduction of the statement, thus waiving the contention that it was not in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Id at 43-44.
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showed not only Walters' intent to travel, but, by inference, Hillmon's in-
tent to accompany him.' 35 The implication then was that the statement
made by Kevin commenting on his and his brother's criminal intentions
would have been admissible as an 803(3) exception.
136
The prevailing view has been that the Second Circuit is correct in its
interpretation of Hillmon."' Indeed, since the adoption of the federal
rules, most courts have continued to permit statements offered under the
Hillmon doctrine to be used to demonstrate the intent not only of the de-
clarant but also of others.'3 8 The Ninth Circuit has continued this prac-
tice. In United States v. Pheaster,139 the court sustained kidnapping,
conspiracy, and extortion charges against two men with evidence that in-
cluded a classic Hillmon statement from the victim.' 4° Larry Adell, the
teenage son of a southern California multi-millionaire, told a date on the
evening he was abducted from a fast-food chain parking lot that he in-
tended to meet "Angelo" in the lot to obtain some free marijuana that had
been promised to him.' 4 ' Adell made similar statements to another
friend.'42 One defendant, Angelo Inciso, was the "Angelo" who allegedly
met, and by inference, kidnapped Adell. He argued that the boy's state-
ment could not be used to show Adell actually met "Angelo" that night.1
43
Inciso contended that, if used at all, the statement should have only been
135. Id (citing 145 U.S. at 296).
136. The Second Circuit continued its support of an expanded reach of Hillmon in
United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76 (1978). In Moore, the court reversed the interstate
kidnapping convictions of two men because of a lack of sufficient evidence. It refused to
rule, however, on the propriety of the lower court's admission of a conversation between one
of the alleged kidnappers and a friend. Id at 82. One kidnapper, Burnell, while bragging
about the abduction plot, told a friend that Moore, his accomplice, "would have somebody
take (the victim) out of the states," and that "he would never be found." Id at 81. On
appeal, Burnell argued that Congress in enacting the federal rules had limited the scope of
Hillmon to declarations of the intended future conduct of the speaker. Id. at 82 n.3. The
Second Circuit brushed aside that contention in a brief footnote. The court indicated that it
viewed the position of the Advisory Committee, which took a standard common-law
Hillmon approach, as controlling. Id
137. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 295, at 698 (2d ed. 1972). The author states that
the courts have not been willing to limit to the declarant those statements offered as evidence
under Hillmon. See Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and the Criminal Defendant: The
Limits of the Hillmon Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REV. 659, 687 (1982), in which the writer states:
"No federal court has expressly refused to apply the common law Hillmon doctrine or the
,undisturbed' version of rule 803(3)."
138. See, e.g., United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
139. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976).
140. Id at 358.
141. Id at 358, 375.




permitted to show Adell's state of mind; thus the name of his intended
contact need not have been given to the jury.' 44
Looking to Hillmon, California case law, particularly Alcalde, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and the California Evidence Code, 145 the Ninth
Circuit rejected Inciso's arguments. 46 Although fully exploring all ave-
nues of the Hillmon debate, the court opted for an expansive, common-law
approach to the doctrine. Thus, it admitted Adell's statement, which ar-
guably by inference, sheds light on Inciso's behavior. 147
Then, in dicta, the court added a confusing caveat. It noted that the
federal rules were not in effect when Pheaster was at trial. The court said,
however, that the rules provided a benchmark for the court to analyze the
common-law status of the state-of-mind hearsay exception. 48 Clearly,
courts applying a common-law analysis of the Hillmon doctrine have per-
mitted a declarant's state-of-mind evidence to support an inference regard-
ing the future conduct of one other than the declarant. 149 Because, as
noted by the court, Pheaster was caught between the common law and the
federal rules, it could be read as merely an intellectual exercise without
precedential value.
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, however, Judge Ely demon-
strated he had qualms about the majority approach to the state-of-mind
144. Id
145. See supra note 28.
146. 544 F.2d at 376-80. The court provided extremely detailed insight into its rationale
regarding the relationship between Pheaster and the Hillmon doctrine. It made note of the
objections by commentators against extending the doctrine to reach the conduct of a person
other than the declarant. It pointed out Professor McCormick's concern about the possible
inaccuracy of an inference from a state-of-mind declaration aimed toward a third party. Id.
at 376 and n.13 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 295, at 698 (2d ed. 1972)). But then the
Ninth Circuit rejected the reservation. "One such objection is based on the unreliability of
the inference but is not, in our view, compelling." 544 F.2d at 376. The court further stated
that Hillmon was a civil case, but was applied with a long reach in Alcalde, which was a
criminal case. It also noted that Alcalde was mentioned with approval by the California
Evidence Code writers, thus rejecting the narrow scope urged by Inciso. Id at 379. As
mentioned previously, the California Evidence Code was an important source for the au-
thors of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See supra note 29. Finally, after addressing the
Advisory Committee and the House Judiciary Committee notes to rule 803(3), the Ninth
Circuit concluded, "[W]e read the note of the Advisory Committee as presuming that the
Hillmon doctrine would be incorporated in full force. . . . [T]he language suggests that the
Advisory Committee presumed that such a broad interpretation was the prevailing common
law position." Id at 379-80. The court opted to uphold the admission of the Adell state-
ment. Id. at 380.
147. Id. at 380.
148. Id at 379.
149. See, e.g., People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944); United States v.
Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1961).
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evidence and that he feared the decision would be precedent-setting.' 50
However, he felt bound by Hillmon to support the majority opinion.'
Nevertheless, Judge Ely noted the vast criticism that had been levied
against Hillmon, mentioning specifically Shepard, Judge Traynor's dissent
in Alcalde, and the commentary of legal scholars.152 Judge Ely said he
agreed with those critics.1 53 He also said the House Judiciary Committee's
intent to limit the Hillmon doctrine was yet additional proof that the views
of the critics "are now widely believed to be valid."' 54
A subsequent application of a common-law Hillmon analysis in United
States v. Astorga-Torres' indicates that the Ninth Circuit now views
Pheaster as controlling. InAstorga- Torres, the court upheld drug and con-
spiracy charges against several defendants, one of whom had implicated
the others by stating he intended to bring "guards" with him to the site of a
large drug transaction. 156 The court cited Pheaster with approval, al-
though noting that Pheaster was technically a pre-rules case that analyzed
the Hillmon doctrine.'5 7 It said that one defendant's comment that he
would bring "guards" with him was admissible under the federal rules as
evidence to show that the declarant carried out his intent. 5 8 But the court
also stated that such evidence required the judge to issue a limiting instruc-
tion to the jury not to use the statement as proof that the guards were
present at the drug purchase or that the defendants were indeed those
guards. 159 Instead, the evidence could only be used to show that the de-
clarant intended to bring guards with him, from which the jury could draw
the inference that he carried out his intent.
60
In Pheaster and Astorga-Torres, the Ninth Circuit has provided an in-
depth examination of its options for the admission of state-of-mind decla-
rations in light of the adoption of the federal rules. But despite its weighty
150. 544 F.2d at 384-85 (Ely, J., concurring and dissenting).




155. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 455 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
734 (1983).
156. Id. at 1333-35. The "transaction" was consummated with buyers who were under-
cover narcotics agents. Id at 1333.
157. Id. at 1336.
158. Id
159. See id & n.2 for full text of instruction. Of course the court does not elaborate as to
where the jury's "proper" inference is supposed to lead them. If the jury can hear the state-
ment of the declarant's intent to bring guards and can infer he carried out that intent, then
the jury will naturally infer that the persons with the declarant are the guards.
160. Id at 1336.
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analysis, it has opted for the traditional Hillmon standard by admitting
statements that reflect not only the state of mind of the declarant but that
of others as well.'
6 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also applies
an expansive, common-law approach to the Hillmon doctrine, but without
discussing the impact of the federal rules on its Hillmon philosophy. A
recent example of this is United States v. Calvert 162 in which the defendant,
Calvert, launched a scheme to enter into a business partnership with an
inventor. As part of his plan, Calvert procured sizable insurance policies
on the inventor's life, naming his own father as beneficiary. Calvert then
planned to hire someone to kill the inventor and intended to collect the
policy proceeds. 63 At trial, over Calvert's hearsay objection, testimony
was admitted demonstrating the victim's future intentions. Specifically,
the victim had told his wife, shortly before he was murdered, that he
planned to discuss with Calvert the possibility of backing out of the inven-
tor partnership and cancelling the insurance. " Evidence also showed that
shortly before the murder Calvert visited an old acquaintance to offer him
$5,000 to kill the inventor.
1 65
The Eighth Circuit upheld the admissibility of the evidence as a state-of-
mind declaration of the victim.16 6 The court said evidence showed the
victim intended to extricate himself from the business arrangement.1 67 It
could also be used to show that he probably expressed that desire to Cal-
vert. Additionally, this evidence could be used to prove Calvert had a
motive to pay a fast visit to his friend to present his murder-for-hire of-
fer.' 68 Without addressing the many inferences that could be drawn from
this evidence regarding Calvert's behavior, the court relied on Hillmon and
rule 803(3) as authority for admitting the statements to show the victim's
intent. 169 Although the Eighth Circuit decided Calvert after the enactment
of the federal rules, no mention was made of the controversy over the
scope of Hillmon that has followed in the wake of the rules. Given that the
court expressed no doubt about the vitality of the common-law Hillmon
approach under the federal rules, it would not be surprising if in the future
161. See supra notes 139-60 and accompanying text.
162. 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1975).
163. Id at 900-01.
164. Id at 910.
165. Id at 901.
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the Eighth Circuit continued this approach. 70
B. The Restrictive Approach: Adopting the House Judiciary Committee's
Limit
Since the Federal Rules have been enacted, two circuits, the First and
the Fourth, have expressly stated that 803(3) limits the reach of Hillmon.
The Third Circuit also supports a limitation on the scope of the Hillmon
doctrine but has made no specific reference to the post-rules controversy
over the use of the doctrine to admit evidence against third parties.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Gual
Morales v. Hernandez Vega ,171 a district court dismissed Gual Morales'
action against his employers, the management of the Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, because it fell outside a one-year statute
of limitations. Gual Morales had alleged that the agency supervisors had
conspired to fire him for his union activities, and that the management
representatives on the grievance panel had conspired to prevent him from
being reinstated. 72 Additionally, Gual Morales asserted that the sewer
agency's lawyer had sought to improperly influence defendant Arroyo, a
member of the agency grievance committee, who was presumably neu-
tral.' 73 The lawyer's conduct, Gual Morales contended, could be attrib-
uted to the management of the sewer authority.'74 While no specific
statements were attributed to the management, the court noted that Gual
Morales had hoped to introduce an affidavit that indicated one of the
170. Calvert, a criminal case involving a state-of-mind declaration in which the declarant
was unavailable to appear in court, also raised a constitutional problem not addressed by the
court. The sixth amendment guarantees the defendant in a criminal case the right to con-
front his accusers. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which states in relevant part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him. ... Arguably, in Calvert, since statements of an absent declarant were intro-
duced by the government to help convict the defendant, he might have a legitimate sixth
amendment argument. The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980), however, runs contrary to such an argument. In that case the Court held that a
defendant could be confronted at trial by the hearsay statement of an absent declarant in
some cases without losing his constitutional protections. Id at 66. The statement, however,
must be reliable. "Reliability can be inferred" if the hearsay falls into the category of a
"firmly rooted exception," id, or if it can be shown to be particularly trustworthy. Id. Sub-
sequently, some scholars have maintained that the hearsay exceptions of the federal rules
should meet the Supreme Court criteria. "In the absence of some special unfairness or unre-
liability, compliance with article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence should constitute
compliance with Constitutional confrontation requirements." 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
supra note 29, at 800-28.
171. 579 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1978).
172. Id at 678.
173. Id at 678, 680.
174. Id at 679.
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agency's attorneys sought to influence the outcome of the grievance pro-
ceeding by "getting to" the neutral member.
175
The First Circuit reversed the summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendants. 76 In so doing, however, the court let stand the trial court's deci-
sion to exclude the state-of-mind declarations alleged to have been made
by the lawyer."1 7 Confining its explanation to a brief footnote, the court
adopted the House Judiciary Committee's limitation of Hillmon. 8 It said
that under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), the attorney's comments, if
made, could not be admissible against another party, namely the defend-
ant, Arroyo. 1
79
In United States v. Jenkins,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit also established the House Judiciary Committee's limita-
tion of rule 803(3) as its standard for allowing state-of-mind admissions
into evidence. While articulating this standard, however, the Jenkins court
permitted the admission of state-of-mind evidence showing the future con-
duct of a person other than the declarant.1 8' Ironically, it did so citing
Hillmon, and distinguishing Jenkins from United States v. Kaplan,182 a
Second Circuit case in which the court excluded state-of-mind evidence
regarding the conduct of a person other than the declarant. 83 The court
defined the issue in Jenkins not as conduct but as rationale or reason for
the conduct.
184
In Jenkins, a federal wiretap intercepted a telephone conversation be-
tween Beatrice Johnson and a suspected drug dealer. In the conversation
the two made plans for an early morning business meeting at the dealer's
home.'85 "I'm on my way," was the last comment Johnson made to the
dealer.'86 Johnson's boyfriend, Jenkins, had driven her to his planned ren-
dezvous and later lied about it to the grand jury.8 7 Initially he said he was
visiting friends in the neighborhood where the drug dealer also happened
to live and that Johnson was along for the ride. He said Johnson never left
175. Id
176. Id at 680.
177. Id at 680 n.2.
178. Id
179. Id. The lower court cited 803(3), FED. R. EVID. 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1983), note to
paragraph (3), which is the House Judiciary Committee restriction of Iillmon.
180. 579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
181. Id at 844-45.
182. 510 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1974).
183. See supra note 124 for a discussion of Kaplan.
184. 579 F.2d at 843.
185. Id at 841.
186. Id at 842.
187. Id at 841.
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the van while he went in to visit these unnamed friends.' 88 At a second
grand jury appearance, Jenkins said Johnson left the van briefly for an
unknown destination while he was inside with these same friends. 89 Fi-
nally, he said he drove to the neighborhood to see a friend, and that John-
son asked to come along to see another unnamed friend. 9 ' The Fourth
Circuit upheld the admission of the wiretap conversation to show why Jen-
kins had made the trip.' 9'
The Jenkins court followed the House Judiciary Committee's 803(3)
limit, attributing it to the will of Congress.' 92 The court noted that had
Johnson's statement been offered to show that Jenkins accompanied John-
son, it would not have been admissible. 93 The Fourth Circuit distin-
guished Kaplan on the basis that the state-of-mind evidence was
accusatorial and not simply explanatory. 94 The court noted that in
Kaplan an undercover narcotics agent was told by a seller of drugs that the
seller's "connection" would be at a drug purchase the next day.' 95 Thus,
when Kaplan was present at the sale, the evidence was, in effect, a com-
ment on Kaplan's role or conduct. 196 In Jenkins, the court maintained that
the evidence was always limited solely to the reason why Jenkins made the
late-night van trip. It did not go to the issue of whether he actually made
the trip, since that was never at issue. 197
The dissent, while fully supporting the court's narrow Hi//mon standard,
asserted that the majority erred in its application of the standard. The
wiretap evidence of the conversation between Johnson and the drug dealer
was improperly allowed to prove by inference what it could not be used to
show directly.' 98 The logical inference from this evidence was that John-
son asked Jenkins for a ride to the drug dealer's home. Thus, it could be
further inferred that Jenkins agreed, knew of Johnson's intended destina-
tion, and deliberately lied about the evening's activities to the grand
188. Id
189. Id at 841-42.
190. Id at 842.
191. Id at 843.
192. Id
193. Id
194. Id at 843-44.
195. Id at 844 (citing 510 F.2d at 608).
196. Id at 844.
197. Id The court also noted that in Kaplan the Second Circuit had decided the under-
cover agent's state of mind was not material to the case as Johnson's was in this instance. Id
See supra note 11, which dicusses Ponticeii, indicating that a declarant's state of mind must
be relevant to admit this type of hearsay.




The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also supports,
in theory at least, a limit on the reach of Hillmon statements. This circuit,
has addressed the issue in a case tried before the enactment of the federal
rules, but brought up on appeal after they went into effect. In Baughman v.
Cooper-Jarrell, Inc. ,2" an out-of-work trucker sued his former employer
and four other companies for conspiring to blacklist him.2°' Following
two trials the lower court ruled, in part, in favor of the truck driver, and
against one of the companies, Wilson Freight Forwarding.2 °2 On appeal,
Wilson argued that the statement of a Cooper-Jarrett vice president was
inadmissible as evidence that a conspiracy existed among the trucking
firms.203 The vice president had said Baughman "will not drive any of
Cooper-Jarrett's trucks ever again nor will he drive for any other freight
company. ' 2 4
The court of appeals maintained that evidence that the trucker would
not be allowed to drive for Cooper-Jarrett was not very probative on the
issue of whether a conspiracy against the trucker existed. 2 5 The evidence
that the trucker would not be permitted to drive for others was probative
only of the speaker's state of mind.2' The court added that it was not
reliable evidence of the future conduct of other firms whose cooperation
would be required to carry out the speaker's intent.2 7 In spite of its nar-
row view of the Hillmon doctrine, however, the Baughman court con-
cluded the evidence could be used to show the vice president's intent to
199. Id The dissent contended, therefore, that Jenkins was an even better argument
than Kaplan for excluding the evidence. It argued that the reason the Second Circuit ulti-
mately reversed Kaplan's conviction was because the jury could not distinquish between the
effect of the comment on the agent's state of mind and its reflection on Kaplan's activities at
the meeting. Id (citing 510 F.2d at 610). This inability by the jury to distinquish was pres-
ent, the appeals court believed, even when the statement was bluntly accusatory and the trial
judge issued a limiting instruction. Id Therefore, in Jenkins, where the comment generated
an inference that was far more subtle, it became even more harmful to the defendant and
should have been excluded. [d
200. 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
201. Id at 531.
202. Id At the first trial, the jury found for the plaintiff against Cooper-Jarrett. Another
defendant settled with Baughman, leaving only one remaining defendant company, the Wil-
son Freight Forwarding Co. A jury verdict resulted in a $25,000 judgment for Baughman,
increased by treble damages to $75,000. The trial court subsequently reduced the judgment
to the original $25,000 and both Baughman and Wilson appealed. Id.
203. Id at 532-33.
204. Id at 532.




Catholic University Law Review
seek the participation of others in the blacklist plot.2"'
The Third Circuit was definitive in limiting the state-of-mind comments
to the intended activity of the speaker, but never mentioned the post-rules
debate over the scope of the Hillmon doctrine.20 9 It did express qualms
over the lack of a limiting instruction restricting the remarks of the declar-
ant only to discern his intent. But the court ruled that enough nonhearsay
evidence of a conspiracy existed to render as harmless error the lack of a
limiting instruction.2"'
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS OF HILLMON
UNCERTAINTY
The federal circuits clearly are not acting uniformly when faced with the
issue of whether to admit state-of-mind declarations that reflect upon the
intended conduct of persons other than the declarant.2 " The Supreme
Court has, to date, refused to become involved in a post-federal rules ex-
amination of the reach of the Hillmon doctrine.2 12 Surely enough courts
have had to face the issue and have ruled in enough different ways to war-
rant a serious exploration by jurists of post-federal rules analysis of cases
involving Hillmon statements. Courts should return to the case that
spawned the controversy because in so doing they might better understand
that the modern-day interpretation of the Hillmon doctrine has been
clouded by Alcalde. As a result, the Hillmon doctrine has been stretched
far beyond its intended reach by the common law courts. This, conse-
quently, has interfered with the ability of the federal circuits to accept the
attempt by Congress, particularly the House Judiciary Committee, to nar-
row the scope of the Hillmon doctrine through rule 803(3).
A. Applying the Hillmon Doctrine to Criminal Cases
The broad-reaching, common-law Hillmon doctrine should not be ap-
plied in criminal cases. Perhaps because of its bizarre and mysterious fact
208. Id Outside evidence of a blacklist existed in a statement made by an agent of the
Wilson company to Baughman and in statements made to Baughman by an employee of yet
another company sued in the blacklist conspiracy. Id at 532-33. The court also said the
vice president's statement should have been admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury.
However, the court considered the lack of the instruction harmless error when combined
with the other information strongly indicating the existence of the conspiracy. Id at 533.
209. Id at 532-33.
210. Id. at 533.
211. See, e.g., supra note 7; see also supra note 109.
212. See, e.g., United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1771 (1983); United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.); cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931
(1978); United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
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pattern, it is often forgotten that Hillmon was a civil case. A recalcitrant
group of insurance companies attempted to avoid paying Hillmon's widow
the proceeds of the life insurance policies he had purchased."z 3 The decla-
rations of letter-writer Walters were used to determine if he had accompa-
nied Hillmon to a campsite. The inference to be drawn was that if Walters
made the journey with Hilimon, then perhaps it was Walters' body and not
Hilmon's that lay lifeless before the campfire. But if the person whose
body was found at the fireside was murdered, the insurance companies did
not have to prove John Hillmon was the killer. In order to prevail, the
companies only had to show that the body found at the campsite was not
one they had insured. Thus, when the Court said that Walters' letters were
competent evidence to show the author's intent to travel with Hillmon and
to permit the inference that the intent was carried out, it could (and did)
ignore the prejudicial impact of that evidence on Hillmon. z1 4
Had Hillmon been facing criminal charges for the murder of Walters,
the Court presumably would have addressed the legal and factual
problems with the evidence. It might have expressed concern about the
possible intervening factors that rendered this evidence untrustworthy.
Bad weather, an argument between the men, and a better job opportunity
all could have led Walters to abort his intended trip with Hillmon.z 5 In-
stead, the Supreme Court waited until Shepard to acknowledge the preju-
213. 145 U.S. at 285-86.
214. Id at 295-96. One of several cases to which the Court looked for precedential value
was Hunter, a criminal case. 40 N.J.L. 495 (1878). In Hunter, the New Jersey court upheld
the admission of statements made by a murder victim to his family that implicated the de-
fendant. The court ignored the possible prejudicial impact of those statements on the de-
fendant. Id at 545. Perhaps because this prejudice was not a concern of the Hillmon Court,
it cited Hunter without exploring this issue. 145 U.S. at 299.
215. For an extensive view of the problems that accompany the use of the Hillmon doc-
trine in criminal cases, see Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and the Criminal Defendant.-
The Limits of the Hillmon Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REV. 659 (1982). The author states:
Admission of statements of future intent that place the defendant and declarant
together at or near the time of declarant's murder endangers the defendant's right
to a fair trial if the jury does not restrict the use of this circumstantial evidence only
to proof of the declarant's probable conduct. Because of the potential prejudice to
the defendant in this situation, the trial court must consider carefully the admissi-
bility of each statement on a case by case basis and avoid perfunctory application
of this exception.
Id. at 695 (emphasis in original). The author argues for courts to apply a rule 403 analysis to
Hillmon statements in criminal cases to ensure they will be examined closely for their preju-
dicial impact. Id at 703-05. FED. R. EVID. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The author urges careful judicial
scrutiny to determine if a Hillmon statement is in fact genuinely material to the case. He
also argues for exclusion of the Hillmon statement when there is sufficient corroborating
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dicial dangers of some state-of-mind comments.2 16 Because Shepard dealt
with a declarant's accusations against her husband for her murder, the
Court warned a jury might not limit the statement for use solely as an
indication of the declarant's state of mind. Indeed, a jury might use the
statement as evidence of the husband's criminal conduct, thus drawing an
impermissible inference.217
Shepard can thus be read as a restriction on the use of Hillmon-type
statements against parties other than the declarant particularly in the con-
text of a criminal case. Read in this context, it becomes clear that the
California Supreme Court erred in Alcalde when it admitted the state-
ments of a murder victim that implicated the defendant in her murder. If,
because of their unreliability and prejudicial impact, a declarant's com-
ments can't be used to show what he or she thought another person had
already done in the past, which is the dicta of the Shepard Court, obvi-
ously a declarant's comments should not be used to show what he or she
thinks another person will do in the future. In essence, Alcalde stretched
the Hillmon doctrine to allow just that. Its expansive interpretation of the
doctrine became the standard common law application of the doctrine by
the courts. But in so doing, Alcalde not only ignored Shepard, but it ap-
plied the Hillmon doctrine to the kind of facts that were never included in
the original Hillmon case. Issues like the potential prejudice to a criminal
defendant implicated by a Hillmon statement in the commission of a
crime, or the effectiveness of a limiting instruction to ameliorate that impli-
cation, were never relevant to Hillmon.
As a result, in Calvert, a criminal decision in the Eighth Circuit, there
was absolutely no discussion of the potential for prejudice in admitting the
evidence. Instead, the court merely cited Hillmon, the federal rules, and
the views of several commentators to admit a declarant's hearsay state-
ment implicating the defendant in a murder.2I" Thus, the Eighth Circuit
erroneously relied on Hillmon for the proposition that the state-of-mind
declarations of one person could be admitted without prejudice to a de-
fendant in a criminal case. In doing so, this and other courts have applied
circular reasoning. They have said in effect that they will admit the state-
ments because rule 803(3), or the Hillmon doctrine in which the rule is
rooted, allowed it. But the Hillmon interpretation on which these courts
are relying and on which the rule is based, is the one established by the
nonhearsay evidence on the ground that the statement is then no longer necessary to prove a
material fact. Id at 700-03.
216. 290 U.S. 96, 104-06 & unnumbered footnote at 105.
217. Id at 104.
218. 523 F.2d 895, 910.
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California Supreme Court some fifty years after Hillmon in Alcalde. The
Supreme Court has never sanctioned the Alcalde reasoning because it has
never addressed directly the issue of Hillmon statements in the criminal
context.21 9 In fact, the Supreme Court has only addressed the issue tan-
gentially in Shepard, and then it noted with concern the strong prejudicial
impact of such evidence in criminal cases.
22 °
2 The Limiting Instruction
Courts admitting Hillmon -statement evidence against third parties often
look to the limiting instruction as a cure-all for any potential prejudice.22'
The limiting instruction has been codified in the federal rules.222 But cer-
tainly the Shepard Court understood the inadequacy of a limiting instruc-
tion in a case where a person's state-of-mind declaration implicates
another in a crime.223 Professor McCormick has said that limiting instruc-
tions are of limited usefulness in stemming the improper use of evidence at
trial.224 Justice Traynor, dissenting in Alcalde, said it was clear a limiting
instruction would not be effective in that case.225 It is difficult to imagine,
for example, how a limiting instruction in Pheaster could possibly render
harmless Larry Adell's voiced intention to meet "Angelo" shortly before
he (Adell) was kidnapped.226 Clearly, the natural inference to be drawn
was that "Angelo" was the defendant, that the defendant was in fact pres-
ent at the parking-lot meeting, and that he certainly had the opportunity, if
not the motive, to abduct Adell.
B. The Confusion Caused by the 803(3) Controversy
I. Confusion under a narrow Hillmon Approach
There is no doubt that the circuit courts are confused about the scope of
the Hillmon doctrine under the federal rules. 227 In some instances when
courts have specifically limited the scope of Hillmon, they seem to have
219. See supra note 212.
220. 290 U.S. at 94, 104.
221. See, e.g., Pheaster, 544 F.2d at 376;41calde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 185, 148 P.2d 627, 630.
222. FED. R. EvID. 105 states: "When evidence is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly."
223. 290 U.S. at 104.
224. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 59, 136 (2d ed. 1972).
225. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 190, 148 P.2d 627, 633.
226. 544 F.2d 353, 374-75.
227. See supra notes 108-09.
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difficulty applying the standard they have chosen.22 8 This was apparent in
the decisions of the Third Circuit in Cooper-Jarrett and the Fourth Circuit
in Jenkins. Relying on oft-cited law review criticism of the broad reach of
the common law Hillmon doctrine, the Cooper-Jarrett court said a declar-
ant's state-of-mind comment was not trustworthy evidence of third-party
conduct.229 But, after expressing its philosophical intention to so limit
Hillmon statements, the court said the evidence was admissible to depict
an intent by the defendant to try to encourage third-party cooperation in a
blacklist against the plaintiff.230 It approved this use of the evidence even
in the absence of a limiting instruction to the jury.2 3' Yet it is difficult, if
not impossible, to comprehend how a jury, presumably unschooled in the
nuances of evidence, could restrict its use of the statements of the defend-
ant without guidance from the court. Given that independent evidence of
the conspiracy existed, the Third Circuit would have better adhered to its
philosophy by ruling that the Hillmon statement was inadmissible and al-
lowing the jury to rely solely on the independent evidence.
Similarly, in Jenkins, 232 the Fourth Circuit bluntly asserted that the
House Judiciary Committee's narrow Hillmon approach was controlling.
But like the common law court decisions that preceded the federal rules,
the Jenkins court ruled that the declarant's statement was admissible to
infer the rationale behind another's conduct to determine that the state-
ment did not violate the post-rules approach to the Hillmon doctrine advo-
cated by the House Judiciary Committee.233 In Jenkins, the defendant lied
to a grand jury about the reason he chauffered the declarant to the neigh-
borhood of her drug supplier.234 By using the statements to show only why
Jenkins made the trip rather than to prove he actually travelled with the
declarant, the court believed it was keeping well within its Hillmon philos-
228. The First Circuit, which in a brief footnote in Gual Morales adopted the House
Judiciary Committee's approach to Hillmon statements, afforded only a minimal opportu-
nity to analyze the committee's rationale. 579 F.2d at 680 n.2. From its brief comment, the
court appears to embrace the limitation without question and to read it literally as a prohibi-
tion against any statement that could shed light on the intended conduct of one other than
the declarant. Id Of course, it cannot be determined at this time how the First Circuit
might rule on evidence that would be very subtle in its implication of a third party. At this
juncture, however, it would appear that this circuit is not confused about its post-rules ap-
poach to Hillmon.
229. 530 F.2d 529, 533.
230. Id.
231. Id The court downplayed the need for the instruction saying independent,
nonhearsay evidence of the conspiracy existed.
232. 579 F.2d at 840.
233. Id at 843-44.
234. Id at 841-42.
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ophy.2" The trial judge had issued an instruction to the jury limiting the
statement to showing only the declarant's state-of-mind as she got in the
vehicle with Jenkins.23 6 From this use, the jury was to have drawn the
inference that Jenkins was asked by the declarant for a ride to the narcotics
dealer's residence, and thus that he lied to a grand jury when he offered
different reasons for making the trip.2 37 But, as more properly reasoned in
the Jenkins dissent, the majority undercut the trustworthiness guarantees
implicit in a narrow reading of rule 803(3).238 It did so by allowing the
prosecutor to prove by inference that which could not be proved explicitly
under the House Judiciary Committee's interpretation of the rule, which
the majority professed to adopt.239 Faithfulness to a narrow interpretation
of the rule should have led the court to uphold the admission of the evi-
dence in any prosecution of the declarant for any alleged role in narcotics
trafficking but to exclude it for any possible use against Jenkins.
The application of the state-of-mind theory espoused by the Cooper-Jar-
rett and Jenkins courts is inexplicable given their assertion of allegiance to
a narrow Hillmon reach. Because the Third Circuit ignored the current
803(3) controversy, looking instead to a critic of a broad Hillmon scope for
support, it can be assumed that its sympathies were with the critic. In
Cooper-Jarrett, however, the practical effect of the court's decision to ad-
mit the statement, particularly without a limiting instruction, was to place
the circuit in the same camp as the opponents of the House Judiciary
Comittee's view of Hillmon. Perhaps in the criminal context, where the
potential for prejudice carries much higher stakes, this court would be less
likely to do this.
In Jenkins, the court appears to have been enticed by a false reason/
conduct dichotomy. Yet there is simply no way of showing the reason one
did an act without also showing that the act was done.2' Given that the
Fourth Circuit was definitive about adopting the House Judiciary Com-
mittee's 803(3) limitation, it certainly must be placed among the minority
of courts taking a narrow Hillmon approach. Looking solely to its applica-
tion of the doctrine, however, one would have to be skeptical of its asserted
position. Unfortunately, because the precise nature of the information be-
235. ld at 842-44.
236. Id at 842.
237. Id
238. Id at 845.
239. Id
240. Ironically, perhaps it is a poet who best understands the futility of this distinction.
William Butler Yeats in his poem Among School Children asks, "How can we know the
dancer from the dance?" THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY, 917-18 (W.W. Norton &
Co. 1970).
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ing sought at trial through the 803(3) exception is so subtle in Jenkins, it
may not be indicative of the court's future applications of this rule. But it
may have been this very subtle reason/conduct distinction that caused the
court to apply a faulty 803(3) analysis. The court stated that this evidence
could not be used to show Jenkins' conduct, but in so stating, demon-
strated that it failed to comprehend the intracacies of the rule.24 ' Certainly
the rule demands that all 803(3) statements be offered to show state-of-
mind; thus when offered to infer conduct, such a statement is also being
used to explain why that conduct will be undertaken. When Larry Adell
said he was going to the parking lot to meet "Angelo" in order to obtain
drugs, he was also explaining why he was going. The inferences are closely
linked. A person intends certain conduct for a particular reason and that
reason leads the person to undertake the conduct. By way of another ex-
ample, in Cicale, when the drug intermediary told the undercover agent he
would be meeting his supplier in a variety of places, those statements could
be viewed as his explanation for why he was meeting the person with
whom he was later seen. Through that explanation, one may draw the
reasonable inference that Cicale completed his intended conduct by meet-
ing the dealer and consummating the narcotics deals.
2 The relationship between 803(3) and 801(d)(2)(E)
Indicating uncertainty over the post-rules scope of the Hillmon doctrine,
some courts have apparently sought to avoid controversy by upholding the
admission of evidence against third parties on alternative grounds. This
was the method used by the Second Circuit in Mangan after it admitted
utter confusion by the post-rules Hillmon doctrine.2 42 Although state-
ments by one brother implicating another in a tax fraud scheme were in-
troduced by the government under 803(3) and under 801(d)(2)(E), the
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the Mangan court opted to
uphold their admission under the latter rule.24 3 The court wrestled with
the issue, however, because it was not clear that the statements, which were
made to a third accomplice, were actually uttered with the requisite intent
to further the conspiracy.2 "
In Cicale, also decided by the Second Circuit, the court blurred the lines
241. 579 F.2d at 843.
242. 575 F.2d at 43 n.12.
243. Id at 44.
244. Id at 43-44. In the end, the court accepted the statements under 801(d)(2)(E) with-
out having to answer the tough question of whether the statements really met the
801(d)(2)(E) "in furtherance" test. It was able to avoid it because the defense apparently
failed to make a timely objection on the matter at trial. Id at 44.
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between 801(d)(2)(E) and 803(3) by admitting state-of-mind declarations
against a third party to support the inference that he was a member of the
drug conspiracy.245 The court, however, bolstered its argument for admis-
sion of the 803(3) statements by noting that the defendant, Cicale, was also
shown to be a member of the conspiracy by independent, nonhearsay evi-
dence.2 46 There are several problems inimical to meshing these two rules.
These rules were tailored to meet particular factual situations.2 47 Rule
801(d)(2)(E), for example, is designed to allow the admission of statements
against other persons who are shown by independent evidence to have
been part of a conspiracy and who act to further that conspiracy. 248 Rule
803(3) is limited to comments that reflect upon a declarant's frame of mind
from which his intended conduct can be inferred.24 9 Courts which in-
terchange these rules avoid grappling with the thornier aspect of each.
In Mangan, by admitting the evidence under 801 (d)(2)(E) solely because
the defendant failed to object, the court was able to avoid dealing with
both rules. Thus, the Mangan court was able to side-step the issue that was
implicit in Cicale: namely, whether state-of-mind hearsay that may be of
questionable admissibility against a third party directly can nonetheless be
used against that party to show he was a member of the conspiracy. The
Mangan court was able to avoid dealing with both rules. The Cicale court
was able to avoid the issue as well by asserting that sufficient independent
eye-witness nonhearsay evidence showed the defendant was part of a drug-
sale conspiracy. Thus, the 803(3) statements should have been unneces-
sary.25° The Cicale court, however, did not address whether these state-
ments were really needed in light of the eyewitness evidence and by failing
to do so, the court also failed to analyze the possible result of admitting the
statements. Admitting 803(3) statements against a third party to support
the existence of a conspiracy would appear to generate a type of circular
ring of evidence. In other words, 803(3) statements regarding one declar-
ant's intended conduct that relied on the cooperation of another could be
used to support the inference that both completed that conduct, which in
turn could be used as evidence of the existence of a conspiracy. This
would open up the door to the 801(d)(2)(E) statements that could be used
245. 691 F.2d at 95, 103-05.
246. Id. at 104.
247. 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 29, at 800-03, 800-15.
248. See supra note 36.
249. See supra note 6.
250. 691 F.2d at 95, 103-04. For an examination by a court, Professor McCormick, and a
student author of the issue of necessity for state-of-mind declarations under the hearsay rule,
see supra notes 11 & 215.
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by one conspirator against another.2"'
In a circuit where the courts firmly adhere to a broad, common-law view
of the Hillmon doctrine, admission of 803(3) statements against a third
party to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy would not pose any
problem. As clearly stated by even the dissent in Cicale, admissible hear-
say outside the 801(d)(2)(E) rule can fully and fairly support an initial
finding that a conspiracy exists.252 If the Second Circuit were to rule
squarely in favor of supporting a broad reach for Hillmon statements, it is
conceivable that prosecutors would rely on it heavily. The government
could use it to admit state-of-mind declarations against members of a con-
spiracy without having to demonstrate the existence of, or the intent to,
further that conspiracy. Nor would the government have to gather non-
hearsay evidence. Instead, it could use the 803(3) evidence to support the
existence of the conspiracy and then get subsequent statements of conspir-
ators admitted under rule 801 (d)(2)(E). But in relying on a failure to make
an objection at trial in Mangan or on independent evidence in Cicale,
these courts have avoided articulating a definite philosophy about the
scope of Hillmon in the post-rules era, thereby affording scant guidance to
litigators.
C. The Fairness of expanded Hillmon
The cardinal precept surrounding all trial testimony, as explicitly stated
in Federal Rule of Evidence 602, is that it be given by a person with first-
hand knowledge of the facts. 253 This is true of statements offered at trial
under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rules.254 The declarant is the
only person with first-hand knowledge of his own mind., Unless the de-
clarant is clairvoyant, he does not have any certainty that his own intended
conduct will come to pass. Such statements are admissible, however,
under the theory that they make it somewhat probable that the conduct
that was intended was carried out. But once these statements venture into
251. This circular ring of evidence theory is somewhat akin to the traditional "bootstrap-
ping" argument against using statements by one conspirator against another to indicate the
actual existence of the conspiracy. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). There
the Court said that without some source of evidence, that a conspiracy existed beyond just
the comments of an alleged fellow conspirator, "hearsay would lift itself by its own boot-
straps to the level of competent evidence." Id. at 75.
252. 691 F.2d at 109.
253. FED. R. EVID. 602 states in relevant part: "A witness may not testify to a matter
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge
of the matter. ... The only exception to the first-hand knowledge rule is in the case of
expert witnesses who may testify without first-hand knowledge of the event. FED. R. EVID.
602, advisory committee note, and FED. R. EvID. 703, which concerns expert witnesses.
254. FED. R. EvID. 803, advisory committee's note.
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the realm of another person's intended conduct, the first-hand knowledge
is gone. The declarant has no way of knowing whether the other party
shares his intention regarding the planned conduct, and thus without that
first-hand knowledge component that is explicit in the federal rules, the
courts, in both compliance with the federal rules and in fairness, should
not admit it.
Some would argue that Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which calls for
the exclusion of overly prejudicial evidence, should be relied upon by
counsel to protect litigants from the adverse impact of state-of-mind decla-
rations that can be used to infer third party conduct.255 Certainly in cir-
cuits where courts have adhered to the view that state-of-mind declarations
may reach third parties, this is one method of guarding against unfair in-
ferences. But the optimum response to the issue of fairness regarding
803(3) admissions should reside in the rule itself. Each exception to the
rule against hearsay was codified because the collective experience of the
judges, scholars, and litigators rendered it trustworthy.256 Clearly 803(3)
statements are most reliable when they are offered as commentary about
what is on the mind of the declarant. Courts should permit them to be
stretched no further.
V. CONCLUSION
The scope of the Hillmon doctrine was greatly broadened by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Acalde. That expansion of the doctrine was very
influential with the common law courts. Congress was certainly aware of
the manner in which the Hillmon doctrine was being applied in the courts
at the time of the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
These rules were designed to unite, not fragment the courts' approach to
evidentiary issues. The circuit courts, however, seem unable to determine
if the Congress meant to narrow the Hillmon doctrine that was broadened
by Alcalde when it adopted the rules. In the name of the fairness that is
supposed to be the foundation of the federal rules, the Hillmon doctrine
should be narrowed to include only a declarant's comments about his own
future conduct. The House Judiciary Committee certainly has said as
much. Some would argue that Congress, by inference, has said the same.
Perhaps it is time for Congress to say as much directly. But resorting to
the lengthy process for reshaping the federal rules of evidence may be
unnecessary.
The courts can look for guidance to those few circuits that have accepted
255. For a student author's outline of the Rule 403 argument, see supra note 215.
256. 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 29, at 800-03, 800-15.
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a narrow Hillmon scope which limits state-of-mind declarations to the in-
tended behavior of the declarant. If more circuits adopt this approach,
perhaps the federal courts will struggle less with the different Hillmon op-
tions, and thereby be less likely to become confused in their analysis and
application of them. If the purpose of the rules is to facilitate the search
for truth in litigation, then the line should be drawn on Hillmon statements
where the knowledge and, consequently, the truth stop.
257
Diane Kiesel
257. FED. R. EVID. 102.
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